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Abstract—Lane-Keeping Assistance System (LKAS) is conve-
nient and widely available today, but also extremely security and
safety critical. In this work, we design and implement the first
systematic approach to attack real-world DNN-based LKASes.
We identify dirty road patches as a novel and domain-specific
threat model for practicality and stealthiness. We formulate the
attack as an optimization problem, and address the challenge
from the inter-dependencies among attacks on consecutive camera
frames. We evaluate our approach on a state-of-the-art LKAS
and our preliminary results show that our attack can successfully
cause it to drive off lane boundaries within as short as 1.3 seconds.
I. INTRODUCTION
Lane-Keeping Assistance System (LKAS) is an Level-
2 driving automation technology that automatically steers a
vehicle to keep it within the current traffic lane [1] . Due
to its high convenience for human drivers, today it is widely
available in a variety of vehicle models such as Honda Civic,
Toyota Prius, Nissan Cima, Volvo XC90, Mercedes-Benz C-
class, Audi A4, and Tesla Model S. For models without such
function yet, there are also solutions such as OpenPilot and
Ghost that can retrofit them to support LKAS after adding
cheap hardware such as a front camera [2]. While convenient,
such function is extremely security and safety critical: When
LKAS starts to make wrong steering decisions, an average
driver reaction time of 2.3 seconds [3] may not be enough
to prevent the vehicle from colliding into vehicles in adjacent
lanes or in opposite directions, or driving off road to hit road
curbs or fall down the highway cliff. Even with collision
avoidance systems, it cannot prevent the vehicle from hitting
the curb, falling down the highway cliff, or being hit by
other vehicles that fail to yield. Thus, it is urgent and highly
necessary to understand the security property of LKAS.
To achieve lane keeping, the most critical step in an LKAS
is lane detection, which by default uses camera due to the
nature of lane lines. So far, Deep Neural Network (DNN)
based detection achieve the state-of-the-art accuracy [4] and
is adopted in the most performant LKASes today such as Tesla
Autopilot and OpenPilot [2]. Thus, the end-to-end security of
the latest LKAS technology highly depends on the security of
such DNN models. While recent works show that DNN models
are vulnerable to carefully crafted input perturbations [5], [6] ,
their methods cannot be directly applied to attack DNN-based
LKASes due to 3 unique challenges. First, prior methods are
mostly designed for classification or object detection, and none
of their attack formulations can be directly applied for lane
detection. Second, to affect the camera input of an LKAS, the
perturbations need to be realizable in the physical world and
can normally appear on traffic lane regions. Moreover, such
perturbations must not affect the original human-perceived lane
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information for stealthiness. Prior works have explored such
threats for traffic signs [7], [8], but not for traffic lanes.
Third, to cause end-to-end impact to an LKAS, the attack
needs to affect a sufficient number of consecutive camera
frames, and most importantly, the attacks on later frames are
dependent on those on earlier frames. For example, if the attack
successfully deviates the detected lane to the right in a frame,
the LKAS will control the vehicle heading accordingly, which
causes the following frames to capture road areas more to the
right and thus directly affect their attack generation. To the
best of our knowledge, no prior work considers attacking a
sequence of image frames with such strong inter-dependencies.
The only prior effort that successfully attacked an LKAS
is from Tencent [9], where they fooled the Tesla DNN-based
LKAS to follow fake lane lines created by a line of big white
dots on road regions originally without lane lines. However, it
is neither attacking the scenarios where an LKAS is designed
for, i.e., roads with lane lines, nor generating the perturbations
systematically by addressing all the three challenges above.
To fill this critical research gap, in this work we design and
implement the first systematic approach to attack real-world
DNN-based LKASes. To practically introduce perturbations,
we identify road patches as the threat model, which is specific
to lane detection models and can normally appear in the
physical world. For stealthiness, we restrict the perturbations
to be within lane lines, and the color space to be on the
gray scale to pretend to be a benign but dirty road patch.
We then formulate the malicious road patch generation as an
optimization problem, and design a multi-frame path bending
objective function specifically for the lane detection task.
To address the challenge from the inter-dependencies among
attacks on consecutive camera frames, we design a novel car
motion model based input generation process and a gradient
aggregation technique.
We evaluate our approach on a state-of-the-art LKAS,
OpenPilot, and our preliminary results show that our attack can
successfully deviate an LKAS to drive off the lane boundaries
within as short as 1.3 seconds, which is far shorter than
2.3 seconds, the average driver reaction time [3]. To better
illustrate the attack effect, we also prepare a short demo
from the victim car driver’s view at our project website
https://sites.google.com/view/lane-keeping-adv-attack/.
II. THREAT MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Threat model. We assume that the attacker can possess
the same LKAS as the one in the victim vehicles and has the
full knowledge of the LKAS via reverse engineering. Before
attacking, the attacker can also collect camera frames on the
target road by driving her own vehicle with the LKAS.
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Fig. 1. An example of our novel and domain-specific threat model: dirty
road patches. The attacker can add malicious input perturbations on top of
such adhesive road patches [10].
Dirty road patch: realizable and stealthy physical-world
attack vector. We identify malicious road patches as the attack
vector, since they are realizable in the physical world and
can normally appear around traffic lanes. For stealthiness,
we restrict these road patches to not cover the original lane
lines and their color to be on the gray scale to pretend to
be benign but dirty. The attacker can print the malicious input
perturbations on asphalt, rubber, or poster, and then place it on
the road. Fig. 1 shows one possible real-world attack scenario
that places an adhesive road patch to introduce malicious input
perturbations to LKAS. Such adhesive road patches are widely
available in the US [10].
Attack goal and safety damages. By attacking the LKAS,
we aim to cause the victim car to have a lateral deviation
large enough to drive out of the current lane boundaries within
the common driver reaction time, which thus fundamentally
breaks the design goal of LKAS and can cause severe safety
consequences. Assuming the victim vehicle locates at the lane
center before the attack, the required deviation is 0.745 meters
on the highway in the US [11] and the average driver reaction
time is 2.3 seconds [3].
The attack goal above can directly cause various types of
safety hazards in the real world:
• Driving off road, which is a direct violation of traffic
rules [12] and can cause various safety hazards such
as hitting road curbs or falling down the highway cliff.
These cannot be prevented even when the vehicle can
perform perfect obstacle and collision avoidance.
• Vehicle collisions, e.g., with vehicles parked on the
road side, or driving in adjacent or opposite traffic
lanes. Even when the vehicle can perform obstacle and
collision avoidance, these collisions are still possible
for two reasons. First, today’s obstacle and collision
avoidance systems are not perfect. For example, a
recent study shows that automatic braking systems in
popular car models today fail to avoid crashes 60% of
the time [13]. Second, even if they can successfully
perform emergency stop, they cannot prevent the vic-
tim vehicle from being hit by other vehicles that fail
to yield on time, given that human drivers have an 2.3
seconds average reaction time [3].
Attack incentives. No matter whether road accidents are
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Fig. 2. OpenPilot LKAS pipeline.
Original camera input Generated camera inputRotated 5° to left Shifted 1m to right
Fig. 3. Car motion model based camera input generation from the original
camera input. The red rectangle denotes the model input area.
actually caused in the end, causing the victim cars to exhibit
unsafe driving behaviors or violate traffic rules can already
damage the reputation of the corresponding LKAS system
providers, e.g., the corresponding car manufacturers. Thus, a
likely attack incentive is business competition, which can allow
one LKAS system provider to deliberately damage the reputa-
tion of its rival companies and thus unfairly gain competitive
advantages. Meanwhile, considering the direct safety impact,
we also cannot rule out the possible incentives for terrorist
attacks, e.g., for political or financial purposes.
III. ATTACK METHODOLOGY
With the problem formulation above, we design the fol-
lowing novel techniques to address the challenges in §I.
Car motion model based input generation. To consider
the inter-dependencies among attacks on consecutive camera
frames, we need to dynamically update camera inputs ac-
cording to the driving trajectory changes during the patch
generation. To address this, we use a bicycle model [14] to
simulate the changes to car trajectory, which is then used to
update camera inputs by applying perspective transformations
to the original non-attacked camera inputs. Fig. 3 shows an
example of this generation process. On the bird’s eye view
(BEV), we apply a car position shift and heading angle change
from the original car trajectory and then project the BEV
image back to the camera perspective. Although it causes some
distortion and partial missing area, the model input area, which
locates at the center, is still complete and usable.
Multi-frame path bending objective function. To gen-
erate the malicious road patch, we adopt an optimization-
based method, which has shown both high efficiency and
effectiveness in previous works. Since the lateral controller
of the LKAS is not differentiable, we introduce a surrogate
objective function to deviate the car as much as possible.
The lateral controller calculates a desired driving path based
on the detected lane lines, and numerically solves a steering
angle plan to enforce this path. The desired driving path
is typically represented by a polynomial function. Assuming
the car strictly follows the path, the derivatives of the path
are essentially the wheel angles it needs to apply. Thus, we
formulate our objective function:
, where pt(x) is the desired driving path in the t-th frame,
Xt is the t-th generated camera inputs including the malicious
road patch, s0 is the initial state and D is the set of the
points where the controller makes steering angle decisions,
2
f(X1, ..., XT , s0) =
T∑
t=1
∑
d∈D
∇pt(d; {Xj |j ≤ t}, s0) + λ||Ωt(Xt)||22 (1)
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Fig. 4. Overview of the optimization pipeline of the malicious road patch.
λ is a weight of the L2 regularization, and Ω is a function
that extracts the patch area in a camera input. pt(x) is decided
by the image inputs of current and previous camera inputs
{Xj |j ≤ t} and the initial state s0 through the DNN model.
We minimize this objective function when attacking to the right
and maximize it when attacking to the left.
Gradient aggregation. Based on the objective function,
we obtain the gradients of each camera input. However,
the gradient descent is not directly applicable to update the
malicious road patch since the patch sizes and portions are
different in each camera input. To address this, we transform
all camera inputs to BEV to align gradients to the same scale
and take a weighted average as shown in Fig. 4. In addition, we
restrict update directions to the gray scale in order to pretend
to be a benign but dirty road patch for stealthiness.
IV. EARLY RESULTS
We evaluate our method on a state-of-the-art open-source
LKAS, OpenPilot [2], which is reported to have similar per-
formance as Tesla Autopilot and GM Super Cruise, and better
than all other manufacturers. [15]. It adopts a general DNN-
based lane detection pipeline as shown in Fig. 2. Particularly,
it implements a DNN model with recursive layers and uses the
standard Model Predictive Control (MPC) [16] as the lateral
controller. We evaluate our method on 3 scenarios and the
results are summarized in Table I. The comma2k19-1 and
comma2k19-2 are real-world highway scenarios selected from
the comma2k19 dataset [17]. The LGSVL-1 is a simulated
highway scenario created by LGSVL, an industry-grade photo-
realistic Autonomous Driving simulator. As shown, our attack
succeeds to cause the victim vehicle to drive out of the
highway lane boundaries (over 0.745 meters deviations) within
1.3 seconds, which is much smaller than the average driver
reaction time (2.3 seconds) [3]. Fig. 6 shows an example
malicious road patch generated by our method.
To better illustrate the attack effect, we prepare a short
demo from the victim car driver’s view at our project web-
site https://sites.google.com/view/lane-keeping-adv-attack/.
In this demo, our attack causes the victim car to drive off a
highway lane after only 0.9 seconds. Fig. 5 shows a snapshot of
the demo. The demo video is synthesized from the transformed
camera image via the car motion model base input generation,
i.e., by placing our malicious road patch on the BEV image,
Fig. 5. A snapshot of our attack demo from the victim driver’s view at
our project website https://sites.google.com/view/lane-keeping-adv-attack/.
In this demo, our attack is able to cause the victim car to drive off a highway
lane after only 0.9 seconds.
TABLE I. ATTACK EFFECTIVENESS WHEN THE DEVIATION GOAL IS
0.745 METERS (DRIVING OFF LANE BOUNDARIES ON THE HIGHWAY).
Scenario Avg. Speed Attack Time Patch Size (W × L)
comma2k19-1 126 km/h (78 mph) 0.9 s 3.6 m × 36 m
comma2k19-2 105 km/h (65 mph) 1.0 s 3.6 m × 36 m
LGSVL-1 72 km/h (45 mph) 1.3 s 3.6 m × 36 m
Drive out of lane boundaries after 0.9 sec
Malicious road patch
Fig. 6. Malicious road patch and car trajectory for comma2k19-1.
generating the camera inputs from the BEV, and updating the
next frame state based on the car motion model.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PLANS
In this work, we design and implement the first system-
atic approach to attack real-world DNN-based LKASes. We
evaluate our approach on a state-of-the-art LKAS and our
preliminary results show that our attack can successfully cause
it to drive off lane boundaries within as short as 1.3 seconds. In
the future, we plan to (1) perform more comprehensive eval-
uation including more diverse scenarios, different car types,
other DNN lane detection models, (2) demonstrate the attack
in real-world experiments, and (3) design effective defenses.
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